Loads / Take off
A typical load for the C-model Chinook was 10,000 lbs. We found that
under almost any condition we could take off and land with a load if it did not
exceed 10,000 lbs.
Inside the aircraft on the panel was a gauge called a Torque meter. It was
graduated into 100 Ft Lb. of Torque and had two needles, marked #1 and #2 for a
corresponding engine. The red line, or do not cross line with the needles
was 840 ft lb. of torque on the gauge. Anything less was flyable, or
should be.
When the load was on board, or on the hook, the pilot would hover at 25 ft or
whatever height was needed to bring the load to 25 foot above the ground. If
the Torque needles did not exceed the red line we could go. Normal practice was
to have them show 50 ft lb. less, giving us a little play room with power.
If there was a runway to take off from, it was load the aircraft and try to
hover. If a hover could not be obtained, no problem. Unlock the
brakes, use the runway and take off like an airplane. At 18 - 20 knots of
airspeed the helicopter flies by itself and will take off 30 - 50% overweight.
It becomes aerodynamic. Landings have to be made like an airplane
also. If it won't hover on take off, you couldn't plan on hovering on
landing. Therefore, all landings were completed to the ground, or a running
landing was made to a landing strip, flying to the ground.
This was a common maneuver then, now its not taught!
In the very center of the aircraft is a square hole cut out of the floor.
The cargo hook is installed in this hole. On any load that required
a sling load, the crew chief (senior crew member) would lay on his stomach and
look through the hole, then instruct the pilot on what was needed, i.e., up,
down, left, right, forward, back, load swinging, load stable. He also
called the load height above the ground on takeoff to hover, departing the
hover for flight, and on landing. From 1 -10 feet off the ground was 1 foot
increments. 10 - 50 foot was 5-foot increments, 50 and above was 25 or
50-foot increments. A good crew chief would be able to put the load anywhere he
wanted by the directions he gave the pilot. The pilot could then tell how
much power would be needed and how much he had to spare. After hours and
hours of practice, it was like a waltz, smooth, and in some cases, the aircraft
never stopped. A load could be hooked up, and take off was one smooth
maneuver. Landing was the same, land, unhook, and depart with only a
second pause at any point.
From the hover, a slow, gentle movement of the cyclic would start the AC moving
forward. It would begin to dip a little and lose 5 - 10 of altitude (one
reason for the 25 foot starting height) then slowly start to pick up
speed. At 18 knots of speed, it would
usually lift drastically and begin to fly.
Power would be greatly reduced now. Once through translational
lift as it was called, 30 - 40% less power was needed to fly. The control
touch to get it to fly without using excessive power was the trick. Our
pilots got real smooth and gently on the controls. You could sit in the
cockpit, watch, and never see the cyclic move, yet it was. Ladies do like
a Chinook pilots hands. :>)
Aircraft missions
Our missions were as varied as your imagination could conceive. An army
in war uses some strange things. At the time, a unit in combat could not
get the soldiers to a "PX". Generally hot meals were not
available, either to the grunt in the field or the artilleryman on a firebase.
Military kitchens were not mobile. C rations were the normal fare.
There were a variety of meals. Although later replaced by the MRE,
the old Cs were much more eatable and desirable. Their taste never
changed and shelf life was ages. (My first Cs were in AIT at Ord in 1966.
They were marked for the Korean war of 1949 - 1954. Still edible). We delivered pallets of C rations to
firebases as a normal daily run. 10, 000 lb. at a time. 24 meals to
a case, hundreds of cases to a pallet.
Once in awhile we resupplied and supported the marines at the DMZ. We landed by a large area, probably 100
yards across, and surrounded with barbwire, and guarded with a marine using
live ammunition, filled with pallets of C rations. 1000s of pallets of C
rations. It was the resupply area where we would pick up the pallets and
move them to the firebases in the area.
We always carried three or four cases (100 meals) of C rations on the aircraft.
Survival food, should we go down in the jungle, and snacks if hungry
during the day and we can't get to a mess hall to eat. They were free -
we had to eat!
We shut down for maintenance near this fenced area of C rations. I left
the aircraft and figured I'd go over and get a couple of cases, toss them on
the aircraft to resupply our bird.
As I approached the fence, the Marine "guard" met me with a rifle at
port arms, up and across his chest in a threatening manner. This stopped
me in my tracks. It took a little talking to convince him not to shoot me
for taking C rations. In the end, he put down the rifle, started throwing
boxes of C rations across the fence faster than I could take them to the
aircraft. He threw so many, I thought he would throw them all to me.
Ironic, from shooting me for trying to get one box, to giving me the
entire field of boxes.
Never did figure out the marines.
We flew a lot of missions in support of the marines along the DMZ. For
some reason, they didn't have enough aircraft to support themselves, or so we
were told. You had to watch the marines. They were a tricky bunch.
We had a couple of missions that made us real leery of whose side they were on.
We were sent north, to move an artillery battery for the marines. Again,
we were chosen because they were short aircraft. OK, report on station
for the battery move. We get a call from the ground commander that we
should make a pass over the firebase before landing to pick up the artillery
pieces. This being a very strange request, we ask why?
The commander informs us that for the past couple of days he has had aircraft
shot and hit while trying to land at his site. If we make a slow pass
over the camp we will "see" if we draw fire and know whether it is
"safe" to land. Our response was, sorry; when you get the
sniper cleared out, call us. We returned to the support area and waited.
It seems the marine aircrews refused to move him because the sniper fire
was so bad, and we were going to be "tricked" into trying.
A couple of weeks later, it was foggy and rainy and a marine base south of the
resupply point needed ammo and fuel. Our crews jumped up to go. The fog
and clouds were so low that the only way to fly the mission was between the
ridges and below the clouds. Normally this is NOT the way we did it. A
Chinook is a truck and one hell of a target at that altitude. Especially when
it can't fly very fast.
When asked why the marines wanted us, it again was because of snipers and
weather. Our crews decided this one was important because of food and ammo.
They requested that the marines provide cover for them in the form of
escort gun ships. (Hueys used as helicopter fighters). The marines
agreed and all the aircraft took off.
The Chinooks went down one valley to the firebases; the Huey gunships went down
another. In the end, the Hueys never saw the Chinooks from take off to
landing. Luckily, the Chinooks made it back with out being shot up.
One of the Chinook crewmen asked the grunts on the firebase why the marines
didn't resupply their own people instead of calling the army. The marine
told our crewman that it was because the "army" had bulletproof
helicopters and the marines didn't. Seems the pilots for the marines were
making up some good stories to "protect" their lack of enthusiasm for
getting shot at. We thought it was a good joke and promptly debunked the
idea, there, and back at the marine base camp.
Returning from a mission near the old Khe Shan firebase, we started receiving
fire from the ground. The Tail gunner, or stinger as he was called, told
me over the intercom that we were being shot at. I promptly told him to
either return fire or leave my aircraft! He complied!
Supporting the marines was different than the army. One of the major
differences was the policy of returning fire if shot at. With the 101st
division, if we were shot at, we had to call our company, who called battalion,
who called group, who called division, who checked with the ARVN force.
If none of these had "friendly troops" in the area that might
be just shooting at the helicopter for "fun", then it would come down
the line and we would have permission to "return fire". Gee, by
the time this all happened, at 100 knots of airspeed, we would be in the next
country. Rarely did we return fire, but when in real danger, we didn't call
anyone!
The marines were different. When briefed by the marines on return fire
policy, it was simple. "If he shoots at you, he ain't friendly, and
you can shoot back"! That's kinda what we figured all along.
It was the way we operated.
As strange as it seems the policies between the Air force, marines, navy,
compared to the army was staggering. If a pilot in any of the other
services damaged an aircraft, his career was just about over, regardless of the
reason. If an army pilot damaged an aircraft, he saw the flight surgeon,
got cleared medically (make sure no limbs were missing), then was given another
aircraft and sent back to flying. Thus some of the attitudes with
"bullet proof aircraft" stories.
We had one Air Force pilot shot down over North Viet Nam, but made it back to
the DMZ where he bailed out. His mayday call was heard by Army and Air
Force. (The Air force kept a c-130 cargo plane as a communications center
flying off the coast for emergency rescue relays). There was an army helicopter
pilot flying in the area and spotted the parachute as it opened and drifted
earthward. The army pilot radioed the C-130 and told him he was circling
the parachute, when the pilot landed, he would pick him up in the Huey and move
him to the nearest hospital where the Air Force could retrieve him.
The Air Force response was NO. Do NOT pick him up when he reaches the
ground. It seems there were two Jolly Green Giants (Air Force Rescue)
departing from Da Nang 100 miles to the south and they would be at the site
within the hour. The Huey crew was instructed to break off and leave the
area, letting the Air Force pilot land and wait on the AF rescue. They
apparently got "credit" for those pilots they picked up and returned.
The army pilot departed the area. I can just imagine the story the AF
rescuers told the downed pilot!
Normal resupply
A normal resupply mission for either the army or marines might be anything.
C rations, cartons of cigarettes, jeep trailers loaded with ice and beer,
a conex (4 X 4 foot steel building rigged as a shower stall), timbers for
building, pallets of sandbags, bundles of steel planking, a jeep trailer with
containers of hot food, large rubber blivets of water, or jet fuel (neither
marked), artillery rounds, etc.
Artillery rounds, depending on the size of the howitzer came either as a
complete bullet (like a rife shell) or separate sections, a pallet of bullets,
and a pallet of powder. For the larger guns, bullets and powder were
separate. You might haul a pallet (5 tons) of bullets, (steel projo as
they were called) or you might pick up a pallet of 5 tons of powder that could
be exploded with static electricity. It didn't much matter.
One load we picked up in the field was the engineer returning from clearing a
mountain for a firebase. We picked up the crew, then a net of equipment.
The crewmembers informed us to be careful that they had 50 - 100 lb. of TNT in
the net below us and we "might" explode. We thought it was
funny they were worried about a few pounds of TNT when we normally carried 5
tons of power that was more powerful that the TNT. They were not amused,
but our crew felt fairly safe with this small load.
Types of missions flown
Fuel blivets - fire on FSB. One of the
missions we flew required moving dozers for clearing the tops of mountains to
install new firebases. The CH-54 Crane was the only aircraft in the
inventory at the time that could lift the dozer. Later years would
produce larger engines for the Chinook and we could move them. For now,
the Crane was the answer.
However, the Crane could only move the mini dozer, D4-5, and only move it for 3
- 4 miles at a time. In order for the Crane to move the dozer, it had to
reduce the fuel load. We would swap fuel and time to fly for the extra
weight of a load. The results were that you could move a heavier load,
just much shorter distances. For the Crane, it was 10 minutes of flight
time with this load. To be able to fly for 10 minutes, fuel had to be
positioned on firebases out to the drop zone.
Chinooks were used to move 300 gal rubber blivets of JP4 to firebases. The
crane would then land at these points, hand pump fuel into the crane, then go
to the next point.
I was assigned one of these missions. We were to move 6 blivets from the
staging area down to the first firebase. As we loaded and took off, I
asked two or three times to verify that the blivets we were carrying were
filled with water or fuel. Every time I was assured that they were water.
For some reason, I had my doubts.
Flight and arrival at the firebase were normal. A typical firebase was
set up so that the infantry (security) and Artillery unit occupied one end of
the mountaintop, and the other end was used for helicopters and resupply. This
meant that we could stack the ammo, steel, etc., away from the troops. It was
also a safety measure to prevent enemy fire or accidents from killing all on
the firebase.
On any firebase with artillery, there were what was known as burn holes.
Artillery powder is shipped in strips of 8, one-pound bags. Each 1 lb
section is a "charge". A fire mission will tell the gunner how
many bags of power or "charge" to put in the tube to get the desired
range. If a "charge" 3 is used, the other 5 "charges"
are extra and thrown away. They are never used! Never! The extra charges are piled in a deep pit and
burned. Powder burning is always away
from everything and everyone because it is still an explosive and can make one
big bang! In large quantities, it could level a firebase.
As we approached the landing area to drop off the water blivets, I notice a
soldier standing near a hole in the ground. A little strange, but,
strange wasn't uncommon in the jungle. I slowed the aircraft and brought
it to a hover over the drop site on the edge of the firebase. As I
terminated the flight, the aircraft is now 25 - 35 foot over the end of the
firebase with about 1800 gallons of "water" in blivets slung under
the aircraft.
I look out the window, and see the kid running from the hole, and a flame
shooting up from this hole in the ground and lapping at my blades 30 foot above
ground. My only response is, hit the button, punch the load and climb.
The power it takes to hover a Chinook on a mountain with a full load is about
maximum engine output. When the load is released, you shoot into the air
like a rocket. The load hits the ground, and in the case of rubber
blivets, one ruptures on the base, and two roll down the side of the mountain,
rupturing as they hit wire and stumps.
No one is killed by the blivets hitting the ground or rolling through the
defense around the edge of the firebase. I then find out we had been
hauling JP4 in the blivets and not water. JP4 is jet Fuel. We were
apparently hauling fuel for a refueling point and didn't know it.
(Refueling points were set up for Ch-54 Cranes, or huge helicopters.
If a load was extremely heavy and could not be lifted with a normal fuel
load, fuel would be burned off until the weight of the fuel would decrease and
let the aircraft pick up extra weight in the equipment it was trying to sling
load. I.e., if you wanted to move a 15,000 load and the aircraft would
only pick up 13000 lbs with a normal load of fuel, you burned off 2,000 lbs of
fuel and then you could add 2,000 lbs to the 13,000 lbs and get a 15,000 lb
load. It was a common practice with both Chinooks and heavy lift cranes.
Trouble was, when you reduced the fuel on board, you reduced the flying
time. With the extra weight the aircraft was trying to lift, it burned
even more fuel per minute than normal. Thus fuel became very critical.
If you burned 4,000 lbs per hour with a normal load of 13,000 lbs (that’s
4,000 lbs per engine, with two engines on board or 8,000 lbs per hour) you might
increase your per engine burn to 6,000 lbs per hour, with the extra weight.
Only having 6-7,000 lbs at Full fuel, dropping to 4,000 lbs and adding
weight, you might only be able to fly for 10 minutes before being out of fuel.
- Thus… We hauled blivets of fuel to pre-determined firebases along the route.
The Crane could "hop" from mountaintop to mountaintop and
refuel at each. It took time, but was very effective)
We had just dumped 1800 gallons of JP4 (7200lbs) on the edge of a mountain
filled with pallets of artillery ammunition, and at the same time, some idiot
was lighting a fire in a pit filled with artillery powder. Both the JP 4
and the pit to burn the powder were under the rotor system as we came to a
hover over the landing site.
As an added benefit, the trash on the base with loose sand bags, paper,
cardboard, etc., was dangerous for the aircraft and rotor blades.
Once clear of the base, and assured by the pathfinder on the ground that there
was no one killed from this little fiasco, I told him to get the ground
commander on the radio. With a lot of complaining and toes in the dirt,
the site commander finally came to the radio.
My instructions to him at that point were short, sweet, and simple. No
burning of powder near a helipad. Ever. Second, until the base was
clean and nothing was able to fly into my units aircraft rotor systems, he
would get no resupplies. If there was any problem with safety in the
future or he had a problem with my demands, there would be a report made to
division and that would probably get him relieved.
Within hours the base was clean enough to eat off of. There was never a
fire hazard on that base again.